/400 cont./

*511 452 debts in full. The latter pay for the others, and, if they know it, they are not surprised. It is a deep-rooted survival of the traditional, essentially collective funds in a system based on an institution of individualistic character, being salaried. Likewise, [166] [602] [592] the salaried person who is one day obliged to pay back more debts than he can meet will be able to send his family to spend a few months among relatives whom he has kept in the natal village, and they will see nothing abnormal in it. He himself will live as a "parasite" in a more favored unit of consumption, and no one will be surprised by it (1).

[114]

1. The problems of credit, complex and not very well known, the elements of which are often imperceptible, have not been followed systematically in the course of this investigation. We hope to make them the subject of a series of investigations which will be devoted especially to them.

*511 592 Is it a sign of evolution that, out of the five units of consumption that have not admitted into their midst any element foreign to the restricted family, two are among the youngest, thus capable of being more strongly influenced by ideas of [452] emancipation? Among these two, we have likewise found a lower percentage of purchases on credit. A broader investigation would perhaps confirm this tendency.

*511 Let us return to the 43 families to ascertain that the first balanced budget appears with the first income of 15,000 francs. The next three again have a deficit, but a smaller one. Taking account of the possible margin of error, one can infer, not a deficit, but a certain difficulty in "making ends meet."

This experiment, however, is too limited for one to be able to conclude with certainty that 15,000 francs is the indispensable minimum monthly income.

All of the budgets following No. 27 clearly have a surplus. We previously noted that the "hole" of No. 34 is due to the cost

/422 cont./ Table XII (cont.)

*511
276

No.	Income	In Proportion to Income				
		Fuel	Illumination	Maintenance	Water	Kola
32	25,000	1.2	0.8	1.0	--	1.3
33	25,000	3.2	0.8	1.0	--	--
34	25,900	1.5	0.4	1.1	--	0.2
35	27,000	2.8	0.2	1.5	--	--
36	34,000	2.0	0.9	1.6	--	--
37	36,000	3.5	0.7	1.1	--	0.1
38	50,000	0.8	0.5	1.4	--	--
39	51,000	1.3	2.5	0.5	1.1	--
40	55,000	3.6	1.2	1.5	--	0.1
41	55,500	2.5	0.5	1.0	--	1.3
42	56,000	1.6	0.5	1.1	--	--
43	81,000	0.4	--	0.6	--	--

/423/

*511 Let us begin with the most obligatory of all, those from which it is most difficult to escape: taxes and the rent of the dwelling (Table XIII).[1]

*511
651 Two of our families do not pay taxes. Nearly all of the others devote at least 1% of their income to them. The tax paid would normally be proportional to the number of adults that the restricted family contains. It is quite often lower;
[659]
[602] one may succeed in escaping the fiscal census. It is sometimes higher: specifically, in three cases where the salaried worker in the city pays the taxes for his relatives who remained in the village.

*511
427 Only 13 families pay rent for the dwelling. Two are given free lodgings by the owner; three are lodged by their
[466] employer. The others are "owners." This ownership is often
[423] limited to a straw hut, or better a plank hut, constructed on an
[342] administrative concession. The most favored build a true house of mud; up to now only one of our family heads has undertaken a "permanent" building.

[1] [see cat 116, pp 62-63. ANALYST]

/430 cont./

*511 871

No. 31: 0.5%
No. 38: 0.5%
No. 39: 0.6%
No. 40: 2.4%
No. 41: 4.4%
No. 42: 0.5%
No. 43: 5.6%

These percentages do not decrease. The explanation is to be seen in the fact that only families with high incomes send all of their children to school, and that, on the other hand, they often prefer, even Moslems, to send them to Catholic school.

*511 794 In three cases the family heads pointed out to us that in one year they were faced with the expenses occasioned by a baptism (which also requires a sheep). For No. 19 the cost represented 11.5% of the income, but only 6.3% and 3.4% for Nos. 26 and 31.

*511 593 602 But the heaviest familial obligation for many is the necessity of sending sums of money to their relatives who are in difficulties. For example, No. 3 sent to a brother a sum representing 2.5% of his income; No. 11, at two times, 4.4%; No. 24, 0.9%. Finally, No. 43 sends 8.2% of his income each month to his family and to that of his wife.

*511 595 Another familial obligation, this one desired: Nos. 18, 35, 38, 40, and 41 actually have two or three households, because they preferred not having all of their wives live together, a whim that comes to, respectively, 18.1%, 6.1%, 10%, 10.6% of their incomes. (The budget of No. 18 has a deficit of 15%.)

*511 357 Thirteen families employ one or several domestic workers. Moreover, all of them are located below the central income. Here is the portion of their budget that is devoted to this:

No. 24: 6.6%
No. 26: 2.2%
No. 27: 6.1%
No. 28: 1.5%
No. 30: 4.1%
No. 31: 4%
No. 34: 4.3%
No. 35: 3.7%
No. 37: 3.8%
No. 38: 2%
No. 40: 3%
No. 42: 1.7
No. 43: 11.1%

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

equipment of Senegal in relation to the existing employment market. These facts must, however, be considered from another angle. The real problems are those of the true integration of education into a developing social environment, its adaptation to various local situations, and the adjustments which must be made in the Senegalese people's conception of education. These problems look, of course, more acute in the big towns, particularly in the former 'centres of assimilation',[1] which have often reached a relatively high school rate (sometimes more than 50 per cent); in many rural districts the critical phase is still a long way off. Recent changes in the position are marked by another important feature to which I shall revert at greater length: the difference in the distribution of the school population classified according to the various kinds of education. The past 10 years have been marked by the development of secondary and technical education, and the introduction of local higher education. At the beginning of 1955, pupils and students were distributed approximately as follows among the different types of education: 87 per cent in primary schools, 9 per cent in secondary schools, 2 per cent in vocational training schools, 2 per cent in higher education and its various equivalents.[2] At the same time education in French West Africa ceased to be an almost isolated system providing degrees and diplomas which were not recognized in metropolitan France and qualified their holders only for subordinate positions in most occupations.[3] The intellectual elite is becoming steadily more diversified. Its ideals are being noticeably modified; some of its prestige values are being revised; the masses are beginning to change their idea of what they mean by the elite. This is a transitional stage, with its own special tensions.

At this stage in the development of education—the outstanding fact in which is that, particularly in the urban primary schools, the demand exceeds the supply[4]—the signs are already fairly evident of a trend towards less mobility in the social scale. The prospects of reaching the ranks conferring most prestige differ in the towns and the rural zones, for the reasons already indicated. They are also tending to be less evenly distributed among the various sections of the urban population as the latter becomes more diversified. It is not, however, a case of the urban population breaking up into closed or nearly closed groups; none of the discernible social categories are of this character, nor can they be in any way likened to social classes.[5] In particular, relations based on kinship in the widest sense of the term continue to play a fundamental role, and maintain in being close ties among all the individuals composing the family group. Severance of these relations occurs only in extreme cases. Nevertheless, a trend towards the crystallization of social categories does appear, through the mere accumulation of circumstances.[6] The problem has been studied in a recent work the principal points of which I will venture to recall.[7] A survey of the urban district of Dakar—confirmed by later research in other cities—showed certain significant differences in the social origins of

1. The 'four communes' mentioned above.
2. Including young people studying in France.
3. Even in teaching, medicine, etc.
4. In Dakar it became necessary to establish part-time classes to meet an ever-rapid increase in demand.
5. Cf. P. Mercier, 'Aspects de la Stratification Sociale dans l'Ouest Africain' (Aspects of social stratification in West Africa), *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, XVII, 1954.
6. Studied, e.g. by G. Balandier, in *Sociologie des Brazzavilles Noires* (Sociology of the coloured population of Brazzaville), Paris, 1955.
7. Cf. P. Mercier, op. cit.

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

cent of the population. Thus, the number of Europeans in intermediate or subordinate posts has substantially increased and the range of competitive situations, instead of growing less is being regularly extended. This affects not only the new elite, but a large segment of the old 'administrative bourgeoisie', and even, to some extent, the workers and lower supervisory grades in industry. And so, while—in theory—opportunities for reaching the highest ranks and simultaneously entering the European group (a consequence foreseen by assimilationist ideology) have increased with the development of education, in reality a radical change in the whole social structure has multiplied the causes of conflict. New factors have cropped up abruptly: further assimilation is gainsaid, Europeans and Africans become more and more sensitive to the realities of race, etc. Obviously, the political consequences of such conflicts are considerable.

I have mentioned cases in which a rift occurred between the elites and the masses, in the early years, at any rate, of the 'colonial elite'. This fact needs some further explanation, while the question of the relations between the 'educated' and the 'traditional' categories calls for re-examination on a wider basis. The stereotyped patterns maintained by the European administration underline the points of divergence. The administration has besides had a tendency—and not only in Senegal—to underestimate the influence of modernist elites and to depreciate their impact upon the population as a whole. True, important tensions can be observed, and some antagonism developed between the citizens (those of the 'four communes'), from whom the major part of the 'colonial élite' came, and the subjects in the other parts of the territory; but such tensions virtually disappeared with the legal changes introduced immediately after the war, a fact which is proof enough how superficial the points of divergence were. The 'educated' classes, moreover, sought to reap all possible profit from the power they acquired in their administrative functions, or in their role of intermediary between producers and the big commercial companies; and that attitude naturally set up a great many local conflicts. Sometimes they sought compensation for their inferior standing in the traditional framework by asserting themselves in the exercise of their new functions. As we have already shown, however, the population as a whole recognized the prestige of the new intellectual elite. True, their prestige did not necessarily displace the traditional prestige, but the two can coexist, a circumstance which stands out most clearly in rural districts. So, even if the 'educated' African has difficulty in fitting into the traditional system or even the family group, even if he is often a maladjusted element, he is rarely the fish out of water whom so many colonial observers considered him. All the elements of the population are still continually in touch.[1] There are two basic reasons for this. First, the range of family relationships is still a very wide one and they themselves are still effective; they maintain their hold on the 'educated' African even when he has left his birthplace. Secondly, religion—chiefly Islam in Senegal—and above all, membership of a sect, which is practically hereditary, continue to be important. The fact that tension between elites and masses led to nothing but quite limited and temporary breaks explains why the recent and entirely conscious effort to retie loose bonds was carried through with comparative ease. It was the new elite that, with political aims in view, inspired this effort. Usually too far removed from the

1. The vitality of racial or regional associations is significant in this respect.

7:Crowder J-5 (1955-1958) 1959
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

me. Diop, Faye, one of his friends, who was secretary to the local theatre, and I sat round the large bowl eating with spoons. A number of people passed, and one old man came in to watch us.

'That's our Griot,' Diop told me. A Griot is a member of a special caste, to be found in the Jollof and Mandinka tribes, who sings, drums, dances and tells jokes—a sort of family jester.

He started to talk in rapid Jollof and soon Diop and his friend were in hoots of laughter. For his pains the bowl of rice was handed to him, and another man who joined him.

'Who is he?' I asked.

'Another relation. I have to feed him,' Diop replied.

'One of the greatest problems in Dakar,' an official of IFAN had told me, 'is parasitism. A man will come to Dakar and get himself a good job, say at ten pounds a month. He has his immediate family to look after. Then along comes a cousin, and installs himself. An uncle from the bush comes to stay three days, decides he likes Dakar and fails to return to his village. A man like this may find he is supporting between eight and fifteen dependants.'

'I suppose that explains why Dakar's population is much larger than opportunities for work would justify?'

'Yes. It's a great problem, because it prevents any accumulation of capital by Africans. People complain that there is no African bourgeoisie here, that all the trade is in the hands of Lebanese and small Frenchmen. It's largely because an African here cannot, by the laws of hospitality, refuse to give a bed and food to his fellow tribesmen.'

'Of course, in a way that's a good thing, because no one goes hungry, and it's one way of redistributing wealth voluntarily. A sort of voluntary welfare state.'

'Yes, but if the African is to control the economy of his own economy, he must be rid of this scourge.'

In Gorée I met a Frenchman to whom Senegalese soldiers used to come immediately after their discharge from the Army to leave all their new clothes and money, otherwise they would have returned to the town to hear: 'Oh, you are the most wonderful, most bountiful man alive.' After that there would have been little left of their money.

Diop was perhaps a classic example of parasitism. He himself was a borrower, only to have other people borrowing from him.

/196 cont./

511 595 The raising of the standard of living, which is symbolized and realized by the acquisition of a durable dwelling provided with modern conveniences, thus seems to go hand in hand with an increase in polygamy. Another factor should also be correlated with it: the educational level. The proportion of polygamists among the literate is higher than the corresponding proportion among the illiterate: 26.5% as against 21.6%.

511 But, as the preceding figures suggest, it seems that the principal cause is to be found in the improvement of economic conditions, and education in this case plays only the role of a /197/ second cause, which is the very thing that permits access to a higher income. Another index runs along the same lines: the average number of persons under the care of the head of the family, persons who do not live in the concession, but either in the city or village. This average figure is distinctly larger for the districts: 219 as against 142 persons under the care of 100 heads of families, in addition to those who live with him. [602]

It is now possible to draw some conclusions which are to be found at the point of convergence with the preceding remarks.

511 592 602 1) It does not seem that what is designated by the deplorable name of "familial parasitism" (1) can be held

> 1. It is not a question of denying the negative and paralyzing influence which a family can exert on the best of its members and which is ordinarily designated by the name of parasitism. But neither should one ignore the positive aspect of solidarity that makes up for the detrimental consequences of migration and eases for the immigrant the transition from the traditional environment to the urban environment.

responsible for the relative increase of the number of persons

/197 cont./

511 592 602 per home in the districts. This fact may be explained by two other reasons: on the one hand, the disappearance of homes reduced to single or divorced persons, in favor of the conjugal family; on the other hand, as part of this, an increase in the number of spouses.

2) Family solidarity is no less a patent fact in the districts than in the quarters. It works in two ways: the first consists of taking complete charge of the housing and support of brothers, nephews, or other relatives. This is shown in the figure of 38% of the families who extend beyond the framework of the conjugal family properly speaking. In this respect the inhabitants of the districts behave much the same as the others. But they make a greater effort with respect to the second form of family solidarity: sending money to relatives to all or part of their living expenses.

369 3) The betterment of living conditions and the participation to a certain degree in the material comfort that the urban environment brings with it do not necessarily mean a rupture and an overthrow of traditional social behavior. On the contrary, on two points, polygamy and family solidarity, there is a reinforcement of these behaviors, and, if one may apply this terminology to Senegal, it is not "detribalization" which should be spoken of, but "supertribalization."

/198/ Conclusion

Despite its youth, Dagoudane-Pikine is a definite city no less than Dakar, although closely dependent upon the latter. It is a city by reason of its area, the size of its population, the effort undertaken with regard to equipment, especially with regard to schools, and finally by the type of work offered to an important part of the economically active population. It is also a typical African city, with its small number of durable buildings, the considerable unemployment, the large number of young people, and above all, its gross [444] deficiencies of public equipment. We have not spoken of its [443] health equipment; it is still terribly inadequate, although

/26 cont./

intermediate character of this category, very mixed concerning the level of studies, way of life, etc., is found again in various domains. 369x 565

C. -- The old familial institutions do not always adapt themselves easily to the environment of the new life into which they are transplanted. They were linked with a collective work organization, all the members of the group being assured of enjoying (under the authority of the family head) the revenue of the latter. The notion of individual work, with individual remuneration, has not been introduced without shock. We shall set aside the categories where the work has remained in the family framework despite the necessary transpositions: farmers and fishermen on the one hand, merchants on the other. In the others, the vigor preserved by the traditional familial institutions is sometimes a curb on the raising of the living standard of urbanized elements. There is the problem, commonly called "familial parasitism," which poses itself in all of the African towns; the obligation to come to the aid of all the members of the kinship group is still strongly felt. We shall not proceed here to a detailed examination of the data gathered on the number of salaried persons, and persons practicing a non-salaried occupation, in relation to the total number of adults in the household. But it is necessary to give a survey of them. 369x 59 [476] [461] [602]

1. When questioned about the reasons for their coming to town, less than 10% of those questioned say that they came to rejoin relatives. But subsequent interviews have permitted it to be confirmed that among those persons who had come, according to their statements, to look for work (58%), there were many who would not have been able to subsist except by joining, upon their arrival, a group of relatives already settled. The process has already been described several times, and we shall not return to it (1). 369x 602 166

1. Cf., for example, G. Balandier, op. cit., one of the latest accounts to date.

17: Mercier--28 S-5 (1953-1954) 1954 MS37 Senegal MS37
Dakar

/26 cont./

There are many who, in the present unemployment crisis, can only maintain themselves in town thanks to the aid of their relatives. This results in a spontaneous form of insurance against unemployment (2).

369x 602● [464]

2. Which has become more and more important in Dakar in the last two years. Without speaking of the seasonal immigrants who find no work, the number of recorded unemployed amounts to more than 2,000.

2. The figures expressing the extent of family groups do not give, in a direct fashion, indications of the importance of this "familial parasitism." The fact of finding work, when it is a matter /27/ of a close relative, does not signify in any way that the group which has formed is going to split up: the tendency toward the traditional familial regrouping is not exercised solely in terms of extreme forms of mutual aid. The other data in figures that we gathered permit in themselves only a first approach to the problem (1). These

[434]

1. In fact, even though the idea of salaried person is clear, that of the person enjoying a non-salaried income is very broad; it does not assume that this income is able to assure completely the subsistence of this person (petty trade, piece work, etc.); this person may, since he is attached to a kinship group larger than the restricted family, benefit from partial aid. The investigation conducted at Thiès on

/27 cont./

369 x
602 ●
[434]

> living standards made apparent the complexity of the notion of income; for example, there are incomes which do not correspond to any work, but come solely from a given social position (belonging to the griot caste, etc.). A similar investigation will be conducted in Dakar in August 1954 and will permit precise statements concerning these problems.

data only represent a snapshot taken on a certain date; the situation is very changeable, the dependent relatives, except when it is a matter of old men, are such only temporarily. Furthermore, the manifestations of familial mutual aid may go beyond the framework of the household. Let us take, in the whole of our population, the family groups containing more than five adults. The number of persons enjoying an income, reported for one adult, comes to between 0.5 and 0.7. One does not ascertain significant differences between categories on the quantitative level, the scale of situations in each one of them being very broad. Qualitatively, however, important differences appear. In the categories of superior functionaries and employees, members of the teaching profession and the intellectual professions, etc., and to a lesser degree among the subordinate functionaries and employees, women practicing petty commerce or similar activities are much less numerous than in other categories (but the number of women in a salaried occupation is higher). On the other hand, among the dependent adults (2), the adult sons and

369 x
602
565

> 2. In our investigations, we have arbitrarily fixed the lower limit for the "adult" category at 18-20 years of age.

/27 cont./
daughters who are pursuing their studies figure much more frequently. While among the laborers, the workers, and to a lesser degree the master workmen, it is above all a matter of relatives -- in the majority close relatives, cousins, nephews -- who are unemployed or without an occupation. We shall thus again find the same grouping of categories, although here the differences are more blurred than in the other domains considered.

D. -- For numerical data on the dimensions of the restricted family, thus on the extension of polygamy, we refer to the account by L. Massé in the present collection. We shall only add certain comments based on complementary studies.

/28/ 1. Religious affiliation divides our population into two groups, one Christian, almost exclusively monogamous (1),

1. There are cases of polygamy, but they are rarely admitted.

the other Moslem, where the tendency toward polygamy is very deep-rooted, but where differences make themselves felt according to the socio-occupational category. It is only on the level of the members of the teaching and intellectual professions, etc., that this distinction based on religion disappears, and that we ascertain, common to Christians and Moslems, a value set on monogamy.

2. It is in fact on the level of values more than on that of de facto situations that this question must be studied. The progression of the number of polygamous men in going from the laborers to the master workmen, passing through the workers, and, in a different sector, going from the subordinate functionaries and employees to the superior functionaries and employees, is found again in going from the petty to the large-scale merchants. Polygamy may be, by the same token, an ideal for all the members of these categories, but it is only realized on occasion (2) starting from a certain material

2. It is obviously limited by the

/33 cont./ 369x 592

and then four adults living on one salary, and subsequently four adults living on two salaries.

G. -- One sees by these examples how a "snapshot" of the situation only furnishes an approximate picture of the totality of the facts. The preceding pages have shown, however, that it does draw an outline of it; it is therefore possible to put down some remarks in the guise of conclusions.

1. The situation is not fixed. The restricted family clearly tends to constitute a milieu of life more closed than [594] in the traditional framework, and to coincide with the household. But this tendency, even in the most Westernized categories, is far from having caused the traditional forms to re- [182] treat everywhere. The obligations founded on kinship in the [602]• broad sense are still strongly felt. But one has seen that a first step toward their gradual weakening has already been made with the transformation of the character of the de facto groupings (extent, structure, etc.). Doubtlessly for a long time yet there will continue to be a gap between the values recognized by the members of these societies and the new structures born out of the transformations imposed from the outside. As for the structure of the restricted family, the proportion of polygamists, for all the cases studied, seems to be [595] at the average level which it attains in a demographically normal population. A regression of polygamy, however, appears to have started in the categories which represent a new type of elite with Western instruction.

2. The variations in the extent and the structure of both the broad group of relatives and the restricted family are not linked in a constant manner to the differences in living standard. [182] The situations /34/ can be extremely variable with equal resources (1). The relation is well marked (2) only in the

1. As the investigations on family budgets conducted in Thiès have indeed shown.